Mining, oil refining, offshore drilling, chemical manufacturing, power generation. These are all capital-intensive industries where accident consequences are potentially high, even if accident likelihood is quite low. At least to the public, the sensational nature of potential accidents—explosions, nuclear meltdowns, gaseous releases—ascribe to these industries a higher degree of responsibility in terms of avoiding accidents.

The nuclear industry came to grips with this reality after the 1979 Three Mile Island accident. Regulatory oversight got stronger, the industry instituted a self-policing organization to enhance its commitment to safe operation and, over time, public confidence slowly recovered. It wasn’t easy, it wasn’t painless and the results weren’t immediate. Still, the fact is that there hasn’t been a nuclear plant accident in the past 30 years.

The lessons learned from Three Mile Island and from the resulting industry and regulatory response hold particular relevance in the aftermath of the recent disasters at the Upper Big Branch coal mine owned by Massey Energy and at the Deepwater Horizon offshore oil well owned by BP. While one accident in a given industry is not necessarily indicative of a completely broken system, accidents can certainly suggest inadequate planning and foresight.

This is where the nuclear industry comes in. After Three Mile Island, industry leaders recognized that pledges to “do better” from the plant’s then-owner, General Public Utilities, would not be enough. They needed to fundamentally change the culture governing nuclear plant operation or risk possible extinction of commercial nuclear power in the U.S. Three Mile Island left the nuclear power industry in a mutually dependent “Three Musketeers” embrace: one for all and all for one.

One aspect of this cultural transformation was the creation of the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO), an industry-funded but independent organization that serves in a self-policing capacity for the nuclear power industry. INPO’s role is in setting safety standards and performance expectations. Just as important is the tangible “peer pressure” that accompanies U.S. nuclear plant ownership and that drives the safety-first nuclear culture.

Those in the nuclear industry would be the first to tell you that operation, regulation and performance are not infallible. The interplay between the plants, INPO, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and others can seem clunky and plodding at times. Nuclear plant owners occasionally claim the NRC is being too conservative or is not fully incorporating technical knowledge. The NRC occasionally claims industry is not responsive enough.

INPO sits in a middle space and at times may feel like a meddling neighbor or an intrusive family relation. What this creates, however, is a healthy tension somewhat akin to the separation of powers and checks-and-balances that defines the American form of government.

There is no direct analog in the coal mining or oil exploration and production industries. Sure, the Mine Safety and Health Administration provides regulatory oversight of the mining industry and the Minerals Management Service provides regulatory oversight of offshore drilling operations, but that is beside the point. As any self-help expert will attest, real change does not occur until the need for change is fully internalized.

Interestingly, the NRC acknowledges that its regulatory role is a necessary but not sufficient ingredient in safe nuclear plant operation. In congressional testimony in early May, NRC Chairman Gregory Jaczko said the commission has shifted from fines as a tool to correct problems “unless there’s a willful [illegal] action” by a plant employee. In short, fines are not sufficient to drive cultural change. There has to be a deep-seated sense of communal culpability.

Jaczko described how the NRC takes an escalating series of actions if NRC or INPO performance indicators begin deteriorating. In part due to the NRC’s enhanced oversight, Jaczko said that 2010 may be the first year in which no plant will be required to work with the NRC to improve its safety performance.

Is the nuclear model perfect? No. But its level of preparation to avert accident sequences is remarkable. One industry executive said that if he were to extract a drill core sample from a concrete containment structure to assess its mechanical and structural properties, specific plans would have to be in place to immediately respond if the unexpected occurred. So even if nondestructive evaluation indicated there wasn’t, say, a structural tendon within five feet of the sample location, work packages would still be ready to engage the technicians, engineering analysts and licensing specialists should a problem arise.

Such worst-case planning is almost routine in the nuclear industry and it’s the kind of cultural commitment to preparation and safety many are looking for from the BPs and Masseys of the world. Sure, it costs some extra money. But with Gulf Coast recovery-related costs certain to reach into the billions, BP may be wishing it had conducted more extensive failure scenario exercises.

I’m not holding my breath that Massey Energy CEO Don Blankinship or BP CEO Tony Hayward will propose a self-policing entity for their industries any time soon. Such a move would look like a self-serving public relations ploy coming so soon after the initiating events. Still, I hope that one of their industry colleagues will step forward.
In a CNN interview, Hayward said the April 20 well blowout and rig explosion would be a “transforming incident in the history of deepwater exploration.” Let’s hope so.

Moreover, let’s hope the Three Musketeers’ motto—and the example of the nuclear industry —serve as transformational signposts.